Subject(s): Elections -- Democracy -- Social choice -- Origins of the state -- Reason for collective choices -- Public goods -- Voluntary provision of public goods with constant returns to scale -- Voluntary provision of public goods with varying supply technologies -- Externalities, Coase theorem -- Allocative efficiency or redistribution -- Public choice in a direct democracy -- Voting ruel, Unanimity rule, Vernon smith's auction mechanism, optimal majority -- Majority rule and redistribution -- Majority rule - positive properties -- Median voter theorem -- Majority rule equilibria when preference are not defined in spatial terms -- Proof of extremal restriction -Majority rule theorem -- Agenda manipulation -- Majority rule-normative properties -- May's theorem on Majority rule -- Rae-Taylor theorem on Majority rule -- Simple alternatives of Majority rule -- Borda count -- Implication of electoral reforms -- Complicated alternatives to Majority rule -- Demand-revealing process -- Point voting -- Hylland-Zeckhauser point voting procedure -- Voting by veto -- Theory of clubs -- Global optimality via voting-with-the -feet -- Theory of revolution, equity -- Public choice in a representative democracy -- Two-party competition-deterministic voting -- Two party democracy -- Median voter hypothesis -- Local public expenditure -- Two-party competition-probabilistic voting -- Normative characteristics of the equilibria -- Equilibria with interest groups -- Candidate competition -- Candidate as a function of expenditure, campaign contributions , representative voting behaviour -- Multi party systems -- proportional representation -- Electoral rules and number of parties -- Coalition formation in multiparty system -- Political performance and the number of parties , commentary -- Rent seeking -- Rent seeking through regulations, tariffs and quotas, governmental contracting, political process , reforms -- Supply of governmental output -- Budget-maximizing bureaucrat , Environment and incentives -- Extensions of the model -- Alternative Institutional assumptions, Alternative behavioural assumptions, Bargaining between sponsor and Bureau -- Empirical test -- Government as a monopolist, Leviathan -- Autocratic government -- Applications -- Political competition and macroeconomic performance -- Political business cycle -- Variables affects voter decision -- Logic of collective action and macroeconomic performance -- Size of the government -- Fiscal illusion -- Bureaucracy and the growth of the government -- Paradox of voting -- Rational voter hypothesis -- Utility maximization -- Rational voter as minimax-regret strategist -- Ethical voter hypothesis -- Ethical preferences as selfish behaviour, selfish voter -- Normative public choice -- Real valued social welfare functions -- Axiomatic social welfare functions -- Paretian liberal -- Social contract -- Two principles of justice -- Critique of the Rawlsian social contract -- Utilitarian contract -- Just social welfare function -- Just political constitution -- Alternative axiomatic characterizations of SWFs -- Social welfare function to constitution -- Normative and positive theories of public choice compared -- Normative theories of redistribution -- Positive theories of redistribution -- Social insurance, social welfare, private welfare, special interest -- Allocation, redistribution and public choice